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ABSTRACT:  We empirically estimate the effects of regulated access prices and firms’ 
multinational status on firm performance by using firm, corporate group, and country level 
information for the European broadband market between 2002 and 2010. Three measures of 
firm performance are used, namely: market share, turnover and productivity. Special 
attention is paid to differences in the impact on the performance measures depending on a 
firm’s position as either a market incumbent or entrant. We find that while access prices 
have a negative effect on entrants’ market share and turnover, the effect on incumbents’ 
market share, turnover and productivity is positive. Further, we find that multinational 
entrants perform better than national entrants in terms of their market share but worse in 
terms of their turnover and productivity. The opposite is true of incumbent multinationals 
which perform better than nationals in terms of their turnover and productivity but worse in 
terms of their market share. This confirms that a firm’s multinational status has a significant 
impact on its performance, and that this impact differs for incumbents and entrants. Finally, 
when evaluating the impact of access prices on firm performance at the mean performance 
of national and multinational firms, we find that the impact of access prices is lower for 
multinational than for national firms. 
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1. Introduction  
 
As in most network industries, telecommunications services were traditionally provided by a 
single, state-owned, vertically integrated operator. All this changed in the 1980s and 1990s 
with the liberalization process and the privatization of these operators. More recently, in 2002, 
the EU promoted the mandatory unbundling (third-party access) regulation aimed at ensuring 
the entrance of new agents in the sector
1
. In order to stimulate competition and to obtain the 
desired effects for markets and consumers, new entrants accessed the incumbents’ fixed-line 
infrastructure at the wholesale level, and cost-based, access (wholesale) regulated pricing 
regimes were adopted in most countries. The rationale behind this framework was that local 
loop
2
 access products would allow entrants to provide services with minimum direct 
investment while relying on the incumbent’s existing network; however, after this first stage, 
entrants were expected to increase their investments as they developed their own infrastructure 
in a process captured by the “ladder of investment” theory (Cave and Vogelsang, 2003). 
 
Within the telecommunications sector, one of the markets affected by changes in the European 
regulatory framework is the broadband service. The main access technology to broadband 
services (providing high-speed Internet access) in Europe is the xDSL (Digital Subscriber 
Lines), which by July 2009 accounted for 80% of broadband retail lines
3
. With the mandatory 
unbundling regulation, new market competitors were able to provide broadband access for 
customers by using the incumbents’ infrastructure, the prices for which are regulated4. Thus, 
firm performance is, in part, dependent on regulatory decisions. For this reason, in this study, 
we evaluate the effect of access regulation on firm performance by observing the regulated 
prices that entrants pay for access to the incumbents’ network to provide Internet services to 
subscribers.  
 
The implementation of regulated rates directly affects, within the mandatory unbundled 
context, firm performance in two ways: it impacts the entrants’ production costs through the 
input prices and it impacts the incumbents’ wholesale and retail income. Therefore, to 
appreciate fully the impact of wholesale access prices on firm performance the approach 
adopted must include performance information in both the retail and the wholesale market.  
 
The changes to the European telecommunications sector over the past three decades have 
meant that in most countries access to Internet services is now provided by a broad range of 
operators: on the one hand, there are the traditional monopolist telecom operators, i.e., the 
incumbents and, on the other, there are the new operators (the alternatives to the traditional 
monopolist telecom operators), i.e., the entrants. Among the incumbents and the entrants there 
are firms that operate in just one country as well as firms that operate in several European 
countries. Thus, in any given country, broadband services might be provided by, for instance, a 
national entrant (with only national operations), a multinational entrant (which might be an 
entrant in several countries and/or an incumbent in another country), and a national or 
multinational incumbent.  
 
                                                 
1
 This new regulatory framework is contained in EU Directives 2002/19/EC to 2002/21/EC. 
2
 The local loop is the wire used by a telecommunications company to connect each consumer to the service 
provider’s network and from there to the rest of the word.  
3
 Own estimation based on EC report (2009). 
4
 The usage is related to the unbundling network elements (UNEs), which represent the different types of access 
that the entrants have over the incumbent’s network.  
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Differences can be expected in the performances of entrants and incumbents, as well as in 
those of national and multinational (with varying degrees of internationalization) firms. In 
addition to the differences between incumbents and entrants from their vertical relation, the 
local market knowledge of entrants and incumbents is likely to differ. Moreover, the resulting 
balance between the costs and benefits derived from the firms’ internationalization process will 
impact differently on their performance. As such, these differences should be taken into 
account when analyzing the performance of Europe’s telecommunications firms. 
 
If we consider that the wholesale access price is a regulatory outcome, then it is subject to a 
certain degree of discretion, which might ultimately lead to regulatory risk. Moreover, a firm’s 
decision to operate as a multinational can be seen as a diversification strategy aimed at partially 
reducing some of the country risks. As such, a firm’s exposure or sensitivity to the regulated 
access price might differ depending on whether it operates nationally or internationally. For 
this reason it is interesting to evaluate possible differences in the regulated price elasticity of 
performance for national and multinational firms providing telecommunications services 
within Europe. 
 
Thus, using firm, corporate group, and country level information for the European broadband 
market over the period 2002-2010, we estimate the effects of regulated access prices and firms’ 
multinational status on three measures of firm performance, namely: market share, turnover 
and productivity. Particular attention is given to differences in the effects on performance 
measures depending on whether the firms are market incumbents or entrants. We find that, 
while access prices exert a negative effect on entrants’ market share and turnover, the effect on 
incumbents’ market share, turnover and productivity is positive. Additionally, we find that 
multinational entrants perform better than national entrants in terms of their market share but 
worse in terms of their turnover and productivity. The opposite is the case for incumbent 
multinationals. These perform better than their national counterparts in terms of their turnover 
and productivity but worse in terms of their market share. Thus, we confirm that firms’ 
multinational status has a significant impact on their performance, and that this impact differs 
for incumbents and entrants. Finally, when evaluating the price elasticity at the mean 
performance of national and multinational firms, we find that the effect of access prices on 
performance is lower for multinational than it is for national firms (both for incumbents and 
entrants).  
 
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature and develops 
the empirical hypotheses regarding the effect of regulated access prices and firms’ 
multinational status on firm performance. Section 3 outlines our empirical strategy and 
discusses data issues. Section 4 presents the estimations and results of our analysis. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Related Literature and Empirical Hypotheses 
 
Most of the recent literature on access regulation has been devoted to analyzing its impact on 
firms’ investment incentives (Valletti, 2003; De Bijl and Peitz, 2005; Hori and Mizuno, 2009). 
The effects of third-party access in Europe have generated considerable debate, in which one of 
the leading questions concerns the impact of mandatory unbundling on a firm’s investment 
incentives
5
. Its proponents claim that unbundling serves to encourage broadband deployment 
                                                 
5
 The literature review on broadband and investment regulation in Cambini and Jiang (2009) provides extensive 
coverage of this debate. 
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and to promote facility-based competition, while its opponents argue that it distorts entrants’ 
make-or-buy decisions, reduces investment incentives and, as such, has been a failure. In a 
change of focus, a recent article by Nardotto et al. (2012) evaluates the effect of open access on 
broadband market performance indicators (penetration and quality) in the UK. The authors find 
that while local loop unbundling entry has not raised total broadband penetration across 
different local markets, it has substantially increased the quality of the service as measured by 
average broadband speed. In this paper, our focus, rather than being on market performance, is 
placed on firm performance. Despite the relevance of firm performance for overall market 
dynamics, and for the provision of the service itself, this is a dimension that has attracted little 
attention in empirical research (see Wallsten and Hausladen, 2009; Grajek and Roller, 2012; 
Cambini and Rondi, 2012) when analyzing the effects of access regulation.  
 
Under the current European regulatory framework, new entrants can access the incumbent’s 
fixed-line infrastructure at the wholesale level with regulated rates and compete with them in 
the retail market
6
. Since the regulated access rate is the price that an entrant must pay to the 
incumbent for each subscriber obtaining a service through the incumbent’s infrastructure, the 
access price is a key ingredient of the firms’ marginal cost of providing the service. As such, an 
inverse relation is expected between access prices and entrants’ performance.  
 
The expected relation between access prices and the incumbent’s performance is not so 
straightforward. When analyzing a firm’s activity in the context of competitive retail markets, 
special attention must be paid to whether it is an operator that participates in multiple levels of 
the industry or not. Generally speaking, a firm usually obtains greater profits in a retail market 
if its rivals’ costs increase, since this induces the latter to raise their prices or reduce their 
output, both of which can increase the revenue of a retail competitor. Thus, it might be thought 
that since the incumbent and the entrants compete directly for retail costumers, the former will 
always benefit from its position as an input supplier, given that it can raise the costs of its retail 
rivals. However, following Armstrong and Sappington (2006) and Sappington (2006), this is 
not always the case, because while the incumbent’s retail income may increase as its rivals’ 
production costs increase, the incumbent’s wholesale profits can fall further than the 
corresponding increase in its retail profits. In this situation, the incumbent’s wholesale profits 
will fall if the quantity of access bought by the entrants falls at a proportionally higher rate than 
the access price goes up, which depends on elasticities. Therefore, the relation expected 
between access prices and the incumbent’s performance will depend on the effect that prevails 
– a positive one from the retail market or a negative one from the wholesale market.  
 
The relationship between the degree of multinationality and firm performance has attracted 
enormous scholarly attention over past decades. However, only limited consensus has been 
established either theoretically or empirically. Studies on the subject have used a diversity of 
theoretical and empirical approaches, ranging from the finance theory of portfolio 
diversification (Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Kim et al., 1993), to the resource view (Kotabe et al., 
2002), to that of organizational learning theory (Ruigrok and Wagner, 2003). In spite of the 
large number of theoretical studies, the empirical evidence has not been robust, and the 
relationship between multinationality and performance has been found to be negative (Denis et 
                                                 
6
 Entrants to the DSL market can provide broadband access to customers by four different means: Full ULL 
(Unbundled Local Loop), line sharing (Shared Access), bitstream access (a technological use of the incumbent’s 
assets), and pure reselling of the incumbent’s services. As of 2009, bitstream access and resale lines represented 
less than 10% of the total DSL retail lines (own estimation based on EC, 2009), so we have discarded them from 
our analysis and focus only on Full ULL and Shared Access rates. 
4
  
 
al., 2002), insignificant or very weak (Tallman and Li, 1996), positive (Gomes and 
Ramaswamy, 1999), and concave (Ruigrok and Wagner 2003). 
 
In the telecommunications sector, empirical analyses of the relationship between the degree of 
multinationality and firm performance are quite scarce
7
. The studies by Gerpott and Jakopin 
(2005, 2007) on mobile network operators are the exception, but they do not find any 
significant results regarding the relationship. Gerpott and Jakopin (2005) found no significant 
evidence of a positive impact of the degree of internationalization on the financial performance 
of mobile network operators, and Gerpott and Jakopin (2007) found that announcements of 
internationalization had insignificant effects on the value of expanding operator stock.  
 
Although no conclusive findings about the relationship between the degree of multinationality 
and the performance of mobile operators have been reported, in the European broadband sector 
there are a priori reasons to believe that the relationship may be significant. However, to the 
best of our knowledge the question has not yet been systematically studied. Given that the 
European broadband service has experienced large movements of firms within its confines and 
that many of them operate simultaneously in more than one country, we believe this is an 
important question and one that should not be ignored when evaluating firm performance. 
Moreover, unlike previous studies, here we pay special attention to the differences between 
entrant and incumbent firms when analyzing the effect of the degree of multinationality on firm 
performance, and how this relates to the access pricing problem, which is a more preeminent 
problem in the broadband than it is in the mobile market.  
 
Multinationals may, on the one hand, gain knowledge as they enter new countries (Ghoshal, 
1987) and develop global strategies that affect national markets, albeit that they might not 
necessarily respond to the conditions of that specific country. They may, moreover, enjoy 
greater bargaining power when, for instance, purchasing equipment (Sarkar et al., 1999). Yet, 
on the other hand, multinationals also face certain costs that are inherent to the 
internationalization process, such as a lack of focus and the overload suffered by their most 
qualified professionals. The balance between these benefits and costs determines the positive 
or negative impact of the degree of multinationality on firm performance. A firm’s 
internationalization can be seen as a sequential process during which the costs and benefits can 
differ depending on the particular stage reached (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and 
Vahlne, 2009). Therefore, depending on the degree of multinationality (e.g. the number of 
countries in which the firm operates), the cost-benefit relation associated with 
internationalization can vary and, in the same way, its impact on firm performance might differ 
with varying degrees of multinationality.  
 
At the outset, broadband services in the EU were provided mainly by each country’s incumbent 
operator. With the opening of access to the incumbents’ infrastructure, incumbents and entrants 
alike began expanding in Europe seeking new business opportunities. Here, a firm’s position as 
incumbent or entrant plays a key role in their performance, especially in a market characterized 
by vertical relations; thus, while incumbents operate at multiple levels of the industry, entrants 
typically operate at a single level. Moreover, depending on whether the firm is an incumbent or 
entrant, its market knowledge will differ. As former monopolist operators, incumbents enjoy 
years of experience and boast valuable accumulated knowledge of their domestic market 
                                                 
7
 Jakopin (2008) presents a literature review and describes a research agenda on internationalization in the 
telecommunications services industry where the majority of  contributions are of a descriptive nature and a 
somewhat limited number of papers (with the exception of econometric studies of international telephony, see 
Einhorn (2002) for a review) empirically test their hypotheses. 
5
  
 
(customers, regulations, doing business, etc.). Hence, as knowledge represents a potential gain 
(among others) of the process of internationalization (Ghoshal, 1987), we hypothesize that the 
balance between the gains and losses associated with the degree of multinationality differs 
between incumbent and entrant firms. As such, we seek to estimate the impact of a firm’s 
multinational status on its performance by taking into account the differences between entrants 
and incumbents in the market. 
 
As discussed above, we expect different effects of a regulated access price on the performance 
of incumbent and entrant firms. One of the outcomes of the regulatory process within the 
European broadband sector is the wholesale access price (Edwards and Waverman, 2006). As a 
regulatory outcome, the access price is subject to some degree of discretion which may 
ultimately lead to regulatory risk (see Armstrong and Sappington, 2006; Sidak and Spulber, 
1998). Moreover, a firm’s decision to be a multinational can be seen as forming part of a 
diversification strategy to reduce in part some of the risks (Levy and Sarnat 1970; García-Canal 
and Guillén, 2008). In line with this risk covering mechanism, multinational firms may be less 
exposed to regulatory risk on the access price than is the case of national (undiversified) firms. 
The lower degree of exposure to regulatory risk enjoyed by multinationals, both incumbents 
and entrants, may translate into a lower impact of access prices in performance (i.e., their 
average performance in the countries in which they operate). Therefore, we can expect the 
regulated price elasticity of firm performance to be lower for multinational firms than for 
national firms. Accordingly, when we estimate the impact of the regulated access price on the 
firm performance of incumbents and entrants, we aim to test whether there are significant 
differences between national and multinational firms in relation to this impact. 
 
In short, while an inverse relation is expected between access prices and entrants’ performance, 
in the case of the incumbents this relation may depend on the combined effects at both the 
retail and the wholesale levels. Moreover, in this study we estimate the importance of a firm’s 
multinational status on its performance by considering differences between incumbents and 
entrants. Finally, we are able to test if there are any significant differences in the impact of 
access prices on the firm performance of national and multinational firms.  
 
 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
In this section we present the empirical strategy and the data used to test the effect of 
regulation and firms’ multinational status on the performance of European telecommunications 
firms. We first present the general approach adopted in a single equation and explain the 
variables used and their data sources (section 3.1). Then, once the relevance of incumbency in 
the context of this study is taken into account, we present the final equation to be estimated 
(section 3.2). 
 
3.1. General Approach and Variables  
 
Eq. (1) represents the performance of firm i operating in country j at time t (Perfijt) as a 
function of the country’s regulated access price (Pjt), the firm’s group multinational status 
(MNgt) and other firm and country level characteristics. 
 
Perfijt = 1 Pjt + 2 MNgt + 3 Xijt + 4Zjt + 5 Fi + 6 Cj + 7Yt + ijt   (1) 
 
Since we are evaluating the effect of country level (Pjt) and group level (MNgt) variables on a 
firm level and time variant variable (Perfijt), particular attention is given to control for other 
6
  
 
determinants of firm performance at firm (Xijt) and country (Zjt) levels. We also control for non 
observable time invariant firm (Fi) and country specific effects (Cj), as well as non observable 
country invariant time specific effects (Yt). 
 
Therefore, our database comprises firm, group, and country level information for the European 
broadband market over the period 2002-2010. To identify firms offering xDSL services in 
different countries, we used the data provided by Point Topic’s Global Broadband Statistics. 
As for the number of subscribers in 2009, our database accounts for 98% of the number of 
DSL subscribers reported by the European Commission’s Communication Committee Working 
Document on “Broadband access in the EU: situation at July 2009”. Our database is completed 
with information from the National Regulatory Agencies and from firms’ Annual Reports 
(from Amadeus Database
8
) to validate the entry date and length of time the firms had been 
operating in each country. Below we explain the variables used to estimate Eq. (1). 
 
3.1.1 Firm Performance 
Firm performance (Perfijt) is approximated using three different measures. The first measure is 
a firm’s retail market share in each country and period (Market Share). While the regulation is 
introduced at the wholesale level, the effect on consumer welfare is observable at the retail 
level. Thus, approximating firm performance by their retail market share allows us to observe 
the firms’ activity at a level where most of the policy implications are evaluated.  
 
The second proxy of performance is a firm’s operative turnover9 in each country and year 
(Turnover). This measure is especially important given the vertically integrated nature of 
incumbents that not only compete in the retail market but also provide inputs to entrants at the 
wholesale level. Therefore, a firm’s turnover allows us to quantify the effect of regulation on 
firm performance above and beyond what is simply observable in the retail market through the 
market share, and to evaluate the prevailing effect on the incumbents’ performance. 
 
Finally, the third proxy of performance is firm productivity (Productivity) measured as the 
turnover per employee (labor productivity) in each country and year. The wholesale access 
price represents (part of) the cost of fixed capital inputs for entrants and the return to fixed 
capital for incumbents. Therefore, by approximating performance with labor productivity we 
can test if the cost and the return of capital have any relevant impact on the efficiency in the 
use of labor. The expected effects of access prices on productivity are the following: (i) 
negative in the case of the entrants (acting over the marginal cost) and (ii) positive in the case 
of the incumbents (better remunerated assets can be reverted to investment in activities, such as 
R&D activities and, ultimately, improve firm productivity, as emphasized by Sidak and 
Spulber, 1998).  
 
Fig. 1 shows the evolution of the average firm performance proxies, for both entrants and 
incumbents operating within European countries. The incumbents’ market share in the country 
of their incumbency has fallen dramatically since new competitors entered the retail market – 
they have lost on average almost 40% of their DSL costumers in nine years. The market share 
held by the entrants started at a EU27 mean level of 3%, increased continuously up to 2008 
when it reached a maximum of 42%, and then stabilized in the last two periods at around 40% 
of the total number of subscribers.  
 
                                                 
8
 Bureau van Dijk, Amadeus http://www.bvdinfo.com/Products/Company-Information/International Amadeus  
9
 For the purposes of this study, we could use either sales or operative turnover (their correlation is 0.999). We use 
operative turnover because the number of observations for turnover is higher in our database. 
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<INSERT FIG. 1 AROUND HERE> 
 
Despite this evolution of market share, the evolution of the incumbents’ turnover tells a slightly 
different story. Incumbents faced on average a reduction of 25% in their turnover when new 
firms first entered; however, their turnover almost immediately stabilized, recording an average 
loss of only 17% with respect to their pre-competition position. Meanwhile, as above where 
market share was a proxy of performance, the evolution of the entrants’ turnover presented an 
upward trend during the period covered in this study. After difficult beginnings, during which 
the entrants lost on average 40% of their turnover during the second year, they recovered to the 
point that, in seven periods, they quadrupled their average turnover.  
 
The evolution of firm productivity (measured as the turnover per employee) provides 
additional information about the performance of European telecommunications firms. The 
main feature of this variable is that, unlike the other two performance measures, the 
incumbents’ productivity is on average lower than that of the entrants, i.e. on average the 
entrants are more productive than the incumbents (for all periods but the first). In the case of 
the incumbents, in spite of their lost turnover and market share, on average their productivity 
almost doubled during the period covered in this study. In the case of the entrants, average 
productivity grew dramatically until 2007 when it reached levels seven times higher than those 
recorded at the beginning of the period. Following periods of decline and subsequent recovery, 
by 2010 the productivity of the entrants stood at an average level that was eight times higher 
than that recorded at the beginning of the period. 
 
3.1.2. Regulation 
We use two regulated price measures as proxies of the regulation (Pjt) variable. Price data 
(Price) are taken from the European Commission “Report on the Implementation of the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Package” for the years 2002 to 2010. The two measures are 
the prices of Full Unbundled Local Loop (ULL) and Shared Access, which represent the total 
average cost on a yearly basis including the monthly rental and connection charges per 
unbundled loop. More precisely, we use European Commission estimates of the total average 
cost based on the total cost for the first year of access to the loop. The average evolution for 
EU27 countries in these two prices is shown in Fig. 2 for the period covered in this study. 
 
<INSERT FIG. 2 AROUND HERE> 
 
The difference in levels between the two prices is due to the use that each type of access makes 
of the incumbents’ infrastructure. While accessing by Full ULL allows the entrant the 
exclusive use of the incumbent loop and the possibility of a high level of product 
differentiation, with Shared Access the entrant installs its own transmission equipment to the 
incumbent infrastructure and the loop is shared by the incumbent (who provides telephony 
service to the consumer) and the entrant (who provides broadband services through the high 
frequency channels of the same line).  
 
Over time both access prices fell (see Fig. 2). The EU27 average of the Full ULL price fell 
from 19.73€ in 2002 to 11.33€ in 2010, while Shared Access fell from 14.70€ to 4.76€ in the 
same period. However, if we analyze price dispersion, major differences emerge. While both 
prices started with the same coefficient of variation (around 0.3 in 2002), the Full ULL price 
dispersion had fallen to 0.2 in 2010, while that of Shared Access had risen to 0.5 by the end of 
8
  
 
the period.
10
 In other words, the total average cost of access to the loop by Full ULL fell over 
time with a decreasing dispersion, while the total average cost of access to the loop by Shared 
Access also fell over time but with an increasing dispersion between the EU27 countries. 
 
As Grajek and Roller (2012) point out, regulatory outcomes such as unbundling policies and 
mandatory access prices might be subject to a possible endogeneity problem. For instance, 
when a regulator’s objective is to promote competition so as to benefit the consumer, it might 
provide cheaper access to stimulate the entry of new players in the market. Hence, the 
regulated access price might be determined by regulators in response to the performance of the 
firms operating in the country. To alleviate this possible problem of reverse causality, and 
given the lack of data for dealing with this problem in a more conventional way,
11
 we opt to 
introduce our main explanatory variable, regulated prices, lagged by one period. This empirical 
strategy for partly overcoming possible problems of endogeneity is based on the empirical 
observation that, due perhaps to the consistency of regulatory policies, current prices are very 
likely to be highly correlated with past values (see Fig. 2). Moreover, since unlike current 
regulatory decisions, it is reasonable to assume that past regulatory decisions are not 
determined by current firm performance, using the lag value of prices might break with the 
possible reverse causality problem. 
 
3.1.3. Multinational Status 
The ownership information in the Amadeus Database allowed us to identify which firms 
belong to corporate groups providing broadband services in more than one country 
(multinationals) and which firms do not belong to corporate groups (providing services only in 
the country observed). On average, firms operate in 2.2 countries, with a minimum of one 
country (national firms) and a maximum of six countries
12
. The national or multinational 
dimension of firms can be incorporated into the analysis in different ways, each of which 
allows us to answer different questions about the effect of multinationals on firm performance. 
The simplest approach is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is part of a group or 
not, taking the value 1 if the firm belongs to a multinational group and 0 otherwise. If the 
variable is defined in this way, it is equivalent to classifying firms between national (when the 
dummy equals 0) and multinational (when the dummy equals 1), thus evaluating the potentially 
differentiated performance of national and multinational firms.  
 
Given that we have firm level information for each country in which the firms operate, instead 
of the dichotomous variable, we use a counting (discrete) variable capturing multinational 
status (MNgt) with the number of firms in each group. When a group comprises N firms 
(because it operates in N countries), the value of the multinational status variable for each of 
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 We compute the coefficient of variation (standard deviation over mean) of both prices for every year in our 
sample. See Appendix I for yearly price statistics including the coefficient of variation. 
11
 As an alternative approach for dealing with this potential endogeneity problem, exogenous shocks in technology 
affecting broadband speed could be used as an instrument for access prices. First, if regulated access prices were 
set by examining the cost of providing the access, a shock in technology (e.g. a new technology that increases the 
network speed) would have to be translated as a change in regulated prices. Second, the shock is exogenous to 
firm performance if all firms in the market provide the service at the new speed at the same time, because there is 
no room for firms to behave strategically. Unfortunately, homogeneous statistics on speed from different sources 
(such as ITU, EU, OECD, as well as other private data sources) date back only to 2006. Thus, the use of this 
instrument, although potentially correct from a methodological perspective, would mean neglecting the initial (and 
important) years after the access regulation policy was implemented (see Figure 2), which were characterized by 
major changes in both firm performance and regulated prices. 
12
 Some of the firms included in our database operate in countries that are not included in our sample of countries 
(EU27). 
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the group’s firms will be N. In this context, non-multinational firms are a special case (the base 
level) where the number of firms in the group (N) equals 1.  
 
Fig. 3 shows the evolution of the multinational status (MNgt)
13
 of European DSL providers 
when considering the EU27 mean values for incumbents and entrants. At the beginning of the 
period, the service was only provided by national firms. Over time, the number of countries in 
which the telecom groups operated grew; both incumbents and entrants expanded. While the 
expansion of entrants stabilized in 2006-2007, with an average of 2.2 firms per group, the 
expansion process of the incumbents continued reaching a maximum of 3.1 firms per group in 
2008, before falling slightly during the last two periods of our sample.   
 
<INSERT FIG. 3 AROUND HERE> 
 
3.1.4. Firm Level Controls 
The set of time variant firm level variables (Xijt) controls for scale and scope economies, as 
well as technological diversification. Given the traditional monopolistic nature of the 
infrastructure of telecommunications services, scale is one of the key dimensions to take into 
consideration when analyzing firm performance. Persistent scale economies allow relatively 
large providers to supply services at lower average costs per subscriber than the costs incurred 
by small providers. Therefore, we should expect a positive relationship between the scale and 
the performance of the firm in the presence of scale economies. To test this relation, a firm’s 
scale is proxied by its number of employees (Nº Employees). If firm performance is 
approximated by the labor productivity, we control instead for the fixed assets per employee (F 
Assets per Emp)
14
. 
 
Scope economies occur when costs are reduced by providing two or more services jointly as 
opposed to just one. In this case it is more efficient for a single diversified firm to produce 
outputs than by splitting up the production of each output. In the case of telecommunications 
providers, the catalogue of services that are most frequently supplied in addition to xDSL 
broadband are home phone, mobile phone, and IPTV
15
. Thus, to analyze whether the joint 
provision of services has an effect on provider performance in the context of this study, we 
proxy scope economies with a dummy variable for service diversification (Diver Service) 
representing whether or not the firm is the provider of any of the aforementioned 
telecommunication services.  
 
In addition, we also include technological diversification as a firm level determinant of the 
performance of European broadband providers. Alternative access technologies allow for some 
degree of product differentiation. For instance, Cable and FTTx allow higher transmission 
rates, which also have more symmetric download (and upload) capacities than xDSL. 
Therefore, since technological diversification allows product differentiation, and this can give a 
firm an advantage over its competitors, a positive relation can be expected between the firms’ 
technological diversification and performance. Here, technological diversification is introduced 
                                                 
13
 The firm’s group multinational status (MNgt) variable is equivalent to one of the most frequently used structural 
measures of internationalization, namely the number of countries in which the group operates (see Dörrenbächer, 
2000 for a review of measuring internationalization). By introducing this variable into the analysis, we can 
evaluate the possible differentiated performance of firms depending on the degree of international diversification 
of their group. 
14
 This is for consistency with a production function approach.   
15
 While today the joint provision of telecom services is common practice, in the first few years of of the period 
covered in this study this was a potential differentiating factor of a firm’s cost structure (e.g. in 2003, 70% of 
firms on average provided joint services).         
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as a dummy variable (Diver Tech) taking a value of 1 if the firm provides broadband services 
via another technology besides xDSL (such as Cable or FTTx) and 0 otherwise.  
 
Firm level variables are useful as controls, but their sign and significance also provide 
additional information on performance determinants in the broadband sector. Thus, to the 
extent that our proxies capture the underlying phenomenon, we can test whether there are scale 
and scope economies or not, and if technological diversification is relevant to firm 
performance.   
 
3.1.5. Additional Controls 
Country level variables (Zjt) include population density, per capita income (GDPpc), and 
broadband penetration. While population density (Pop Dens) accounts for differences in the 
infrastructure costs of providing services, the income and broadband penetration rates (BB 
Pen) help to control for different market potential across countries. The population density and 
per capita income data come from the Eurostat database, while the data on the broadband 
penetration rate are taken from the International Telecommunication Union.
16
 Time invariant 
firm (Fi) and country (Cj) controls aim to capture all those effects that are specific to a firm or 
to a country that we cannot observe, but which might exert some influence on firm 
performance. 
 
3.2. Incumbency Interactions 
 
In the context of this study, one of the most important considerations about the firms is their 
incumbency in the country in which they operate. Differences between the incumbents and 
entrants can be captured by performing separate estimations for these two broad types of firm. 
Unfortunately, given the limited number of firms operating in the market, specifically as 
regards the number of incumbents, if we follow this strategy when estimating the incumbents’ 
performance equation, the number of observations is quite small (just 141 observations). 
Moreover, introducing year, country and firm fixed effects further reduces the degrees of 
freedom of the estimations performed.  
 
Alternatively, we adopt the approach of introducing a dummy variable (IncD) indicating 
whether the firm is an entrant or incumbent in the market. IncDij takes the value of 1 if the firm 
is the country incumbent and 0 otherwise. Thus, the IncDij variable controls for firm 
characteristics that are specific to all incumbents and which distinguish them from entrants 
independently of the country in which they operate.  
 
As previously discussed, we can expect different effects of access prices (Pjt-1) and the 
multinational status of the firm’s group (MNgt) on firm performance depending on the firm’s 
position as market incumbent or entrant. Therefore, we proceed in our analysis in line with Eq. 
(2) in which we introduce both the interaction between the access prices and the firm’s position 
as entrant or incumbent in the country (Pjt-1*IncDij), as well as the interaction between the 
multinational status of the firm’s group and its position as an entrant or incumbent in the 
country (MNgt*IncDij).  
 
Perfijt =   1 Xijt  + 2 IncDij  
                                                 
16
 To avoid possible problems of multicollinearity between GDPpc and BB pen, given that previous studies in the 
literature on economic growth report a positive relationship between these two variables, (see Koutroumpis, 2009; 
Czernich et al., 2011), we make use of the broadband penetration rate with one period lag. 
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 + 3MNgt+ 4 MNgt*IncDij         (2) 
 + 5  Pjt-1   + 6 Pjt-1*IncDij  
 + 7  Zjt   + 8 Fi + 9 Cj + 10Yt + ijt 
 
Additionally, for consistency and for purposes of interpretation of the estimated results, the 
multinational degree (MNgt) and the lagged access prices (Pjt-1) are also introduced into the 
analysis. Thus, the impact of the group is captured by two variables: the multinational status 
(MNgt) and its interaction with the IncDij (MNgt*IncDij), while the impact of regulation is 
captured by two variables: the access prices (Pjt-1) and their interaction with the IncDij (Pjt-
1*IncDij). It should be highlighted that during the period covered in this study, two of the EU27 
incumbents (in Italy and UK) were vertically separated. Since our hypotheses rely on the 
vertically integrated nature of the incumbent firms, the observations of these incumbents were 
excluded from our estimations for the years after separation. All variables (except for the 
dummies and ratios) are measured in logarithms, and monetary variables are expressed in 
thousand constant 2006 €. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE> 
 
4. Results 
 
In order to analyze the impact of access price and multinational status on firm performance, we 
use the performance equation (Eq. 2) to estimate six models corresponding to the three 
performance variables and the two access prices described above. We are particularly 
interested in testing whether the influence of regulated prices and multinational status on firm 
performance differs between incumbents and entrants. For all the estimations we use firm and 
country fixed effects to control for time invariant determinants at the firm and country level, as 
well as time fixed effects to control for any EU-wide time-trend in the data. The analysis of the 
effects of the access price on the performance of incumbents and entrants is undertaken by 
computing the elasticity of performance relative to price
17
 while that of the effects of the 
multinational status is undertaken by computing the marginal effect.   
 
We estimate Eq. (2) by means of panel data techniques and report the within estimator results
18
 
in Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) correspond to the results for the determinant of the firms’ 
market share with Full ULL and Shared Access prices respectively. Likewise, columns (3) and 
(4) correspond to the results for the determinant of the firms’ turnover, and columns (5) and (6) 
refer to the firms’ productivity. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE> 
 
4.1. Regulated Access Price  
 
                                                 
17
 Given the introduction of interaction terms, the price elasticity is not directly observable through the simple 
observation of the estimated coefficients. Following the chain rule, we compute the elasticity at the mean 
performance (of incumbents and entrants) and at the mean price (also holding other variables at their sample 
means). When firm performance is approximated in terms of market share, we first calculate the semi-elasticity to 
account for the semi-log nature of Eq. (2), and then we compute the percentage points resulting from the 
evaluation of the semi-elasticity at the incumbents’ and entrants’ sample mean. 
18
 We address heteroskedasticity with robust standard errors. See Appendix II for the homoskedasticity test and 
additional diagnostic test results confirming the stationarity of the series.     
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Overall, results from estimations of Eq. (2) support a significant effect of access prices (lagged 
one period to avoid the possible problem of reverse causality) on firms’ performance (see 
Table 2
19
). In the case of the entrants while both prices (Full ULL and Shared Access) exert a 
negative and significant effect on entrants market share, only the Full ULL price is significant 
in the case of entrants’ turnover, and none of the prices are significant determinants of entrants’ 
productivity. In the case of the incumbents only the Shared Access price has a positive and 
significant effect on their market share, and the effect of both prices on their turnover and 
productivity is positive and highly significant.  
 
Table 3 reports the price elasticity of firm performance at the sample mean resulting from the 
estimated models. These results indicate that, when holding other variables at their sample 
means, a 1% increase in the wholesale price will result in a loss of between 2.1 (in the case of 
Shared Access) and 7.5 (in the case of Full ULL) market share points for the entrant and in a 
gain of 7.5 market share points for the incumbents (in the case of Shared Access). 
 
<INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE> 
 
On the one hand, the entrants’ turnover is significantly influenced by wholesale prices only in 
the case of Full ULL. On the other hand, both prices have positive and significant effects on 
the incumbents’ turnover. Thus, while a 1% increase in the Full ULL price translates into a 
5.6% loss of entrants’ revenues (see Table 3) and a 7.3% rise in the incumbents’ revenues, with 
a 1% increase in the Share Access price the entrants lose 0.3% (although this is not significant) 
and the incumbents gain 3.9% more revenue.  
 
Regulated access prices exert positive and significant effects on the incumbents’ productivity 
and non significant effects on that of the entrants. Thus, holding other variables at their sample 
means, a 1% increase in the wholesale prices will translate into a productivity improvement of 
incumbent providers of between 9.3% (in the case of Shared Access) and 19.2% (in the case of 
Full ULL).  
 
The negative effect that wholesale access prices exert over entrants’ market share indicates 
that, when observing the retail market directly, the empirical hypothesis of an inverse relation 
between regulated prices and entrants’ performance is confirmed. These results are highly 
consistent with the wholesale access policy developed within the European broadband sector 
during the period covered by this study, which aimed at increasing entrants’ participation at the 
retail level and at enhancing retail competition by means of cheaper access to the incumbent 
network.  
 
In general, the difference in the estimated effects of Full ULL and Shared Access prices might 
be explained by the use that each type of access makes of the incumbent’s infrastructure. 
Entrants’ market shares are more sensitive to Full ULL, because they need to devote more of 
their resources to access the input (i.e., the access price level is higher) and they need to make 
greater investments to use this wholesale access product that allows them a higher degree of 
diversification. Moreover, the significant effect on the entrants’ turnover of the Full ULL price 
might be driven by the impact that this price has on the entrants’ market share which, as 
pointed out above, is relatively high with respect to the Shared Access price.  
                                                 
19
 Given the interactions with the incumbent dummy the significance of the effects from prices (as well as those 
from multinational status) are not directly observable via the coefficients (see Eq. (2)). In the case of the entrants, 
the significance comes from the lagged price coefficient without the interaction, and in the case of the incumbent 
from the sum with and without the interaction.    
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The counterpart of a declining wholesale access prices policy is the effects that these have on 
the incumbents’ performance. Beyond the ‘desirable’ effects observed at the retail level, with a 
decease in the incumbents’ market share (given its positive relation with the Full ULL price), 
there are additional effects associated with the positive relation between the wholesale access 
prices and the incumbents’ turnover and (most importantly) their productivity.  
 
In line with the empirical hypothesis, the expected effect of an increase in wholesale access 
prices is that the incumbents’ wholesale profits will decrease if the quantity of access bought 
by entrants falls at a proportionally higher rate than the rise in access prices, which depends on 
elasticities. Estimated wholesale price elasticity on retail entrants’ market share seems to 
confirm that this condition is met. The change in access bought by entrants is proportionally 
higher than the change in the wholesale price. Therefore, at the wholesale level the estimated 
relation between the regulated price and incumbent turnover is negative. Nevertheless, the total 
effect on incumbent turnover is attributable to a combination of both the retail and the 
wholesale effects. Consequently, the estimated results of a positive and significant wholesale 
price elasticity of incumbent turnover seem to indicate that the prevailing effect acting over the 
incumbent turnover is the retail market effect.  
 
The positive and strong estimated effect of regulated prices on incumbents’ productivity merits 
special attention. For incumbents, wholesale access prices represent remuneration for their 
infrastructure assets. Thus, by reducing these prices their remuneration worsens, a situation that 
may not be reversed by investments in infrastructure and other activities such as R&D, which 
ultimately could improve firm productivity.       
 
It should be stressed that while the incumbent market share is not significantly influenced by 
the Full ULL price, in the case of entrants the negative effect of the access price is significant 
(mainly) in terms of their market share. Therefore, policies oriented at promoting competition 
in the retail market may be effective by altering this price, while they will have a minimum 
impact on the incumbents’ market share. Nevertheless, the incumbents’ productivity is 
significantly and highly sensitive to the wholesale access prices (particularly in the case of Full 
ULL access). Hence, there is a trade-off between favoring entrants in terms of market share 
and the performance of incumbents in terms of their turnover and productivity. Consequently, 
considerable attention should be paid to the effect of policies on other dimensions of the firms, 
above all those to which the policies are not specifically directed.  
 
4.2. Multinational Status 
 
Our results regarding the impact of multinational status on firm performance (see Table 2) 
show that only when the entrant operates in three or more countries does it perform 
significantly better in terms of its market share than a non-multinational entrant. In addition, a 
multinational entrant with operations in two countries performs significantly worse in terms of 
turnover and productivity than a non-multinational entrant. Table 4 reports the estimated 
marginal effects of firms’ multinational status on firm performance measures. These are the 
marginal effects when comparing the base level of non-multinational firms with multinational 
firms across their different statuses (while holding other variables at their sample means). 
Thus, in the case of the entrants, the results indicate that when the firm is a multinational 
operating in three countries, its market share is around 4% higher than when it is a non-
multinational firm. Likewise, if the multinational operates in four to six countries its market 
share is between 9.6 and 13% higher than when it is a non-multinational firm. Multinational 
entrants with operations in two countries have both a significantly lower turnover and 
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productivity than non-multinationals; the turnover is between 1.7% lower and the productivity 
is 3.5% lower. 
  
<INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE> 
 
Our results regarding the effects of multinational status on incumbent performance shows, on 
the one hand, that when the firm operates in three or more countries the performance is 
significantly worse in terms of its market share than that of non-multinationals (between 5 and 
16%). On the other hand, our results show that if the incumbent operates in five countries, its 
turnover is around 3% higher that if it where a non-multinational. In addition, when the 
incumbent operates in three or more countries it performs significantly better (between 4.5 and 
9.5%) in terms of productivity than a non-multinational incumbent. These results support the 
belief that a firm’s multinational status has a significant impact on its performance. 
 
Overall, these results seem to confirm the hypothesis that the balance between the gains and 
losses of multinational status differ between incumbent and entrants firms. On the one hand, 
for entrants the positive effect on their market share represents the possible gains from 
operating in more countries. However, the negative effect on their turnover and productivity 
seems to indicate that the positive effect on their market share from operating in more countries 
is outweighed by the costs incurred when expanding their operations, resulting in a negative 
impact on both turnover and productivity. On the other hand, multinational incumbents 
perform worse than non-multinational incumbents in terms of their share of the market in 
which they hold the incumbency. This is possibly a consequence of their becoming active in 
new markets at the expense of a decrease in interest in their original market. Nevertheless, the 
better results in terms of turnover and productivity seem to capture the positive effects of 
international expansion by entering other countries. 
 
4.3. Regulated Access Price: National vs. Multinational   
 
To extend our analysis of the impact of wholesale prices on firm performance, we computed 
the effect of regulated access prices on the mean performance of national and multinational 
firms (both incumbents and entrants). In general, our results show that the performance of 
multinational firms is less sensitive than that of national firms to changes in wholesale prices: 
the impact of prices is lower (in absolute value) for multinationals than it is for nationals firms 
(see Table 5). These results, in line with the approach that sees multinationals as a risk 
diversifying mechanism, might indicate that, via the international diversification of their 
operations, multinationals are better able than national firms to cover wholesale access price 
risks.     
 
<INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE> 
 
The results of the additional firm level control variables (see Table 2) confirm that the firms 
included in this study exhibit significant economies of scale (this result holds for the three 
performance variables used). Service diversification exerts a significant effect only when firm 
performance is approximated by their market share. Finally, our results do not confirm the 
existence of a significant performance enhanced effect from the technological diversification of 
the firms. This probably responds to the fact that during the period covered by this study this 
type of diversification was quite low (on average 20% of the firms were diversified). 
 
Our results regarding the economies of scale and service diversification merit special mention. 
First, economies of scale exert a positive effect on all three performance indicators evaluated. 
15
  
 
This leads to a discussion as to the preferred composition of the sector: one with few big firms 
or one with several small firms. Second, service diversification only exerts a significant effect 
when firm performance is approximated by the firms’ market share. Thus, firms that aim to 
gain a greater stake of the market might be successful if they provide more than one service to 
their subscribers, that is, by exploiting the scope economies present in the sector.  
 
Finally, our results for the additional country level control variables only show significant 
effects for income per capita in those cases where firm performance is captured by their 
turnover and productivity, indicating that firms perform better in countries where the 
subscribers have a relatively higher purchasing power. The absence of any more significant 
results for the country level variables is possibly a consequence of the inclusion of both 
country and firm level fixed effects.  
 
This paper represents an initial step towards a possible future study of the welfare effects of the 
regulatory framework on firm performance. European policy is oriented toward promoting 
retail competition by stimulating the entry of new agents in the sector. This is being achieved 
via mandatory access with a falling regulated wholesale price. A lower level of concentration 
might lead to greater competition, with potentially lower retail prices and gains on consumer 
surplus. However, as confirmed by our result, the sector is characterized by scale economies 
and the incumbents’ productivity is highly sensitive to the wholesale access prices. Thus, there 
are also possible negative welfare consequences of the current regulatory framework. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this study we have empirically tested the effects of regulated access prices and firms’ 
multinational status on firm performance. The analysis has been performed using firm, group, 
and country level information for the European broadband market for the period 2002-2010. 
Three measures of firm performance have been used, namely: market share, turnover and 
productivity. Special attention has been given to differences in the effects on performance 
measures depending on a firm’s position as market incumbent or entrant. 
 
We find a negative effect of access prices on entrants’ performance and a positive effect on that 
of incumbents. Our results indicate that the effect that prevails in the relationship between 
wholesale access prices and the incumbents’ performance is positive. Although the impact of 
wholesale access prices on the incumbents’ performance can be negative at the wholesale level 
(driven by the negative wholesale price elasticity on the entrants’ retail market share), the 
effect from the retail level is positive (on the incumbents’ market share). Hence, the latter 
seems to be driving the total positive effect on the incumbent’s turnover and productivity.  
 
Moreover, in the period covered by this study, a firm’s multinational status has a significant 
impact on its performance, and this impact varies for incumbents and entrants. We find that for 
multinational entrants, the positive effects on market share derived from their operating in 
more countries are outweighed by the costs incurred when they expand their operations. This 
results in a negative impact on both their turnover and productivity. In the case of multinational 
incumbents, the estimated positive impact of the degree on internationalization on turnover and 
productivity seems to capture the positive effects of international expansion and entry into 
other countries, albeit at the cost of a loss of market share in their country of origin. We also 
found that multinational firms are less sensitive to access prices than are national firms. 
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Although a number of valuable conclusions can be drawn from this study, certain shortcomings 
should also be noted. First, given the availability of data, the retail subscriber related to each 
type of wholesale access is not directly observable; hence, our results only take into account 
differences between Full ULL and Shared Access prices from the perspective of the wholesale 
market. Second, more detailed firm-level data on retail prices would enable us to disentangle 
better the wholesale and retail effects on the performance of incumbents. Nevertheless, this 
study represents a novel contribution to the analysis of the impact of the regulatory framework 
on firm performance in an industry characterized by vertical relations, with incumbents and 
entrants, as well as with firms that present varying degrees of international operations.    
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Fig. 1 Evolution of firm performance: EU27 average. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Evolution of access prices and the coefficient of variation: by country and EU27 average. 
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Fig. 3 Evolution of multinational status: EU27 average. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Market Share 488 0.4526 0.4093 0.0003 1 
Turnover  476 13.8538 1.6377 9.9512 17.5709 
Productivity  463 5.8608 0.8940 2.7464 10.3071 
Diver Tech 488 0.2090 0.4070 0 1 
Diver Service 466 0.9291 0.2567 0 1 
Nº Employees  466 7.9724 1.6362 3.5263 12.0882 
F Assets  479 13.7880 1.9978 6.2996 18.1192 
F Assets per Emp 466 5.7971 1.1688 1.0072 9.6673 
IncD 488 0.4446 0.4974 0 1 
MN 488 2.2397 1.5898 1 6 
Price (Full ULL)  466 2.5008 0.2455 1.8324 3.4660 
Price (Shared Access)  465 1.5868 0.5659 -0.4403 3.1047 
GDPpc 488 9.8963 0.6221 7.9219 11.2104 
BB Pen 468 0.15327 0.0805 0.0008 0.3199 
Pop Dens 488 4.8174 0.8297 2.8375 7.1701 
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Table 2: The effects of regulated access price and multinational status on firm performance 
 
 Market Share Turnover Productivity 
 (1) 
Full ULL 
(2) 
Shared 
Access 
(3) 
Full ULL 
(4) 
Shared 
Access 
(5) 
Full ULL 
(6) 
Shared 
Access 
Diver Tech 0.0112 0.00756 0.147 0.135 -0.109 -0.133 
 (0.0176) (0.0117) (0.194) (0.198) (0.186) (0.191) 
Diver Service 0.0624** 0.0550*** 0.00693 -0.00942 -0.186 -0.212 
 (0.0277) (0.0161) (0.323) (0.322) (0.205) (0.208) 
Nº Employees 0.0337*** 0.0307*** 0.626*** 0.625***   
 (0.00675) (0.00542) (0.0905) (0.0922)   
F Assets per Emp     0.379*** 0.381*** 
     (0.0725) (0.0722) 
IncD 0.394*** 0.446*** -1.337** -0.126 -1.508** -0.426** 
 (0.104) (0.0674) (0.649) (0.271) (0.594) (0.198) 
MN Nº of Countries       
Two 0.00836 0.00677 -0.231** -0.234** -0.206* -0.200* 
 (0.0273) (0.0136) (0.104) (0.111) (0.113) (0.111) 
Three 0.0409* 0.0339** -0.175 -0.188 -0.128 -0.129 
 (0.0237) (0.0151) (0.113) (0.120) (0.111) (0.112) 
Four 0.118*** 0.110*** -0.246 -0.270 -0.169 -0.187 
 (0.0380) (0.0341) (0.192) (0.193) (0.180) (0.178) 
Five 0.116** 0.0965** 0.0885 0.0844 0.145 0.182 
 (0.0532) (0.0453) (0.350) (0.345) (0.317) (0.312) 
Six 0.132** 0.115*** 0.184 0.168 0.0751 0.0836 
 (0.0537) (0.0429) (0.345) (0.337) (0.309) (0.303) 
MN  Nº of Countries x  IncD       
Two -0.0412 -0.0265 0.163 0.189 0.187 0.190 
 (0.0418) (0.0314) (0.115) (0.120) (0.128) (0.129) 
Three -0.169*** -0.171*** 0.404** 0.370** 0.445*** 0.393** 
 (0.0442) (0.0526) (0.180) (0.182) (0.167) (0.168) 
Four -0.168*** -0.185*** 0.518* 0.533* 0.502** 0.538** 
 (0.0500) (0.0491) (0.271) (0.280) (0.234) (0.241) 
Five -0.252*** -0.231*** 0.369 0.340 0.431 0.346 
 (0.0602) (0.0598) (0.366) (0.361) (0.338) (0.334) 
Six -0.296*** -0.278*** 0.0601 0.0532 0.244 0.208 
 (0.0776) (0.0940) (0.391) (0.384) (0.365) (0.357) 
Price t-1 -0.0877*** -0.0365** -0.300* -0.0271 -0.104 0.122 
 (0.0288) (0.0159) (0.261) (0.149) (0.205) (0.0921) 
Price t-1 x IncD  0.0859** 0.0997*** 0.707** 0.356** 0.551** 0.203* 
 (0.0384) (0.0319) (0.277) (0.145) (0.251) (0.111) 
GDPpc -0.0296 0.00692 0.610 0.632 1.259*** 1.214*** 
 (0.0642) (0.0634) (0.477) (0.476) (0.446) (0.435) 
BB Pen t-1 -0.0632 -0.184 -0.279 -0.355 -0.916 -0.769 
 (0.242) (0.255) (1.175) (1.139) (1.514) (1.515) 
Pop Dens 0.591* 0.595 1.201 0.00299 -0.353 -2.246 
 (0.330) (0.414) (1.697) (1.871) (1.723) (1.791) 
Constant -3.012 -3.512 -2.841 2.890 -6.129 4.385 
 (1.997) (2.603) (10.49) (10.78) (10.02) (9.910) 
Observations 376 375 374 373 374 373 
R-squared 0.983 0.984 0.968 0.967 0.885 0.885 
Note: Dependent variables are Market Share, Turnover, and Productivity. All estimations are controlled by firm, 
country and time fixed effects. Regulated access prices are lagged one period to avoid the possible problem of 
reverse causality. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3 Price Elasticity 
 
 Market Share Turnover Productivity 
 Full ULL Shared Access Full ULL Shared Access Full ULL Shared Access 
Elast on Entrants -0.0757*** -0.0211** -0.0568* -0.0034 -0.0453 0.0358 
Elast on Incumbents -0.0031 0.0749** 0.0734*** 0.0398*** 0.1923*** 0.0938*** 
Note: When firm performance is approximated by the market share, the Table shows the market share percentage 
points resulting from the evaluation of the semi-elasticity at the incumbents and entrants sample mean. As in the 
main estimations, price elasticities are calculated with regulated access prices lagged one period to avoid the 
possible problem of reverse causality. See Appendix III for robustness checks on price elasticity with a different 
number of price lags. 
 
 
Table 4 Multinational Effects (from the base level of one country) 
 
 Market Share Turnover Productivity 
Nº Countries Full ULL Shared Access Full ULL Shared Access Full ULL Shared Access 
Entrants              2 0.00836 0.00677 -0.0173** -0.0175** -0.0357* -0.0348* 
3 0.0409** 0.0339** -0.0131 -0.0140 -0.0222 -0.0224 
4 0.1179*** 0.1097*** -0.0184 -0.0203 -0.0293 -0.0325 
5 0.1164** 0.0965** 0.0065 0.0062 0.0244 0.0306 
6 0.1322*** 0.1153*** 0.0136 0.0124 0.0127 0.0142 
Incumbents         2 -0.0328 -0.0197 -0.0049 -0.0032 -0.0031 -0.0017 
3 -0.1281*** -0.137*** 0.0163 0.0130 0.0536** 0.0447* 
4 -0.0497 -0.0755** 0.0193 0.0186 0.0562** 0.0592** 
5 -0.1359*** -0.1342*** 0.0322** 0.0299** 0.0953*** 0.0875*** 
6 -0.1633** -0.1624** 0.0173 0.0157 0.0540 0.0493 
 
 
 
Table 5 Price Elasticity: Differences between national and multinational firms 
Note: Significance of differences between national and multinational firms comes from Wald tests under the null 
hypothesis that price elasticity is equal for both. As in the main estimations, price elasticities are calculated with 
regulated access prices lagged one period to avoid possible problem of reverse causality. 
 
 Market Share Turnover Productivity 
 Full ULL Shared Access Full ULL Shared Access Full ULL Shared Access 
Elast on Entrants       
Nationals -0.0764*** -0.0219** -0.0586* -0.0036 -0.0462 0.0374 
Multinationals -0.0748*** -0.0202** -0.0548*  -0.0032 -0.0442 0.0340 
|Nat| - |MN| 0.0016*** 0.0017** 0.0038 0.0004 0.0020 0.0026 
Elast on Incumbents       
Nationals -0.0032 0.0779** 0.0765*** 0.0425*** 0.2021*** 0.1007*** 
Multinationals -0.0031 0.0721**  0.0701*** 0.0369*** 0.1818*** 0.0863*** 
|Nat| - |MN| 0.0001 0.0085** 0.0064*** 0.0056*** 0.0203*** 0.0144*** 
 Nat > MN Nat > MN Nat > MN 
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Appendix I: Yearly Access Price Statistics with Coefficients of Variation (CV) 
 
Table AI.1: Full ULL Price Summary Statistics 
Year Mean Std. Dev. CV Min Max 
2002 19.7304 5.8808 0.2981 11.5676 31.9871 
2003 18.5322 6.9260 0.3737 10.5270 32.0093 
2004 14.0449 4.0582 0.2889 9.0954 25.5840 
2005 12.8240 2.8617 0.2232 9.3000 18.6000 
2006 12.5174 2.4001 0.1917 8.8842 17.7451 
2007 12.2166 2.3182 0.1898 8.6635 18.1738 
2008 12.2534 2.2546 0.1840 8.6648 19.2535 
2009 11.8460 2.9358 0.2478 6.2493 19.1559 
2010 11.3308 2.2185 0.1958 6.9129 15.4465 
 
Table AI.2: Shared Access Price Summary Statistics 
Year Mean Std. Dev. CV Min Max 
2002 14.7066 5.2709 0.3584 6.4001 21.7495 
2003 12.1091 5.6145 0.4637 5.3876 22.3037 
2004 7.4623 3.7907 0.5080 2.9063 18.6074 
2005 6.3644 2.8522 0.4481 2.8500 14.6300 
2006 6.2669 3.0781 0.4912 1.1893 15.1386 
2007 5.9198 2.7331 0.4617 1.0326 12.6758 
2008 5.6271 2.5669 0.4562 0.6438 11.4323 
2009 5.3064 2.7677 0.5216 1.0124 10.9323 
2010 4.7656 2.3598 0.4952 0.8927 8.9607 
  
 
Appendix II: Diagnostic test results  
 
To be confident of our estimation results, we performed several diagnostic tests. We were 
particularly concerned by the possibility of heteroskedasticity as well as by that of the 
nonstationarity of the dependent variables and the main variable of interest as they are all likely 
to be trending variables that can lead to a spurious regression problem. 
 
We test for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test under the null 
hypothesis that the error variances are all equal versus the alternative that the error variances 
are a multiplicative function of one or more variables. The results reported in the table below 
indicate that heteroskedasticity may be a problem in our estimations. Hence, to address this 
problem the results in the main text were estimated with robust standard errors.       
 
Table AII.1: Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Homoskedasticity test    
 Market Share Turnover Productivity 
 Full ULL Shared Access Full ULL Shared Access Full ULL Shared Access 
Chi2(1) 5.34 8.20 3.40 3.45 11.47 11.54 
Prob > chi2  0.0208 0.0042 0.0651 0.0634 0.0007 0.0007 
H0: Homoskedasticity, the error variances are all equal. 
 
In addition, to rule out possible spurious regression problems arising from nonstationarity of 
the series we performed a Fisher-type test (see Choi, 2001) on the performance variables and 
on the main variable of interest (regulated prices and multinational status). This test is based on 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests under the null hypothesis that the panel data structure of 
each variable contains a unit root. From the results presented in the table below, we can reject 
the null hypothesis that the variables show a unit root. Note that in the table we present two of 
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the statistics reported by the test, and the results are consistent for both statistics; thus, we can 
rule out any possible spurious regression problems arising from the nonstationarity of the 
series. 
 
Table AII.2: Fisher test on stationarity of panel variables 
 Inverse chi-squared Modified inv. chi-squared 
 Statistic p-value  Statistic p-value  
Market Share 499.1269 0.0000 22.3037 0.0000 
Turnover  293.9337 0.0000 10.1667 0.0000 
Productivity  196.0799 0.0000 4.7425 0.0000 
Price (Full ULL) 158.5974 0.0000 10.0649 0.0000 
Price (Shared Access) 81.2472 0.0097 2.6219 0.0044 
MN 320.3204 0.0000 11.3813  0.0000 
Note: H0: The panels contain a unit root. To mitigate the impact of cross-sectional dependence we follow the 
procedure suggested by Levin et al. (2002), by introducing the mean test option.   
 
 
 
Appendix III: Robustness Checks on Price Elasticity 
 
Table AIII.1: Price Elasticity without lags 
 
 Market Share Turnover Productivity 
 Full ULL Shared Access Full ULL Shared Access Full ULL Shared Access 
Elast on Entrants -0.0499* -0.0180** -0.0461* -0.0144 -0.0660 -0.0080 
Elast on Incumbents -0.0276 -0.0102 0.0973*** 0.0335*** 0.1861*** 0.0660*** 
 
 
Table AIII.2: Price Elasticity with one lag 
 
 Market Share Turnover Productivity 
 Full ULL Shared Access Full ULL Shared Access Full ULL Shared Access 
Elast on Entrants -0.0757*** -0.0211** -0.0568* -0.0034 -0.0453 0.0358 
Elast on Incumbents -0.0031 0.0749** 0.0734*** 0.0398*** 0.1923*** 0.0938*** 
 
 
Table AIII.3: Price Elasticity with two lags 
 
 Market Share Turnover Productivity 
 Full ULL Shared Access Full ULL Shared Access Full ULL Shared Access 
Elast on Entrants -0.0705** -0.0194** -0.0357 -0.0040 0.0414 0.0562 
Elast on Incumbents -0.0045 0.0681** 0.0588** 0.0312** 0.1776** 0.0858*** 
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